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LIST OF PARTIES
In the original action, civil number 5719, the following
plaintiffs sought recovery for the death of Wallace Muir:
Evelyn Muir
Linda Muir
Deanna Pfeiffer
Sandra Jenkins
Mark Muir
In that action the following plaintiffs alleged personal
injury:
Mario Jenkins
Douglas Bailey
The action was filed on behalf of all plaintiffs by:
Ross C. Anderson
William P. Schwartz
Hanson and Anderson
50 West Broadway, 6th floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 532-7520
The plaintiffs were later represented by:
Robert H. Copier
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-0099
The only defendants served in civil number 5719 or any
subsequent actions were:
Apache Nitrogen Products, fka Apache Powder Company,
represented by:
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H. James Clegg
Shawn E. Draney
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145; and
W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc., represented by:
Roger P. Christensen
Karra J. Porter
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 355-3431
Before civil number 5719 was dismissed, plaintiffs filed a
new action, civil number 5873.

In that new action Virginia Lowe

was added for the first time as a plaintiff.

Mr. Copier appeared

as counsel for all plaintiffs in that action.
The first action, civil number 5719, was dismissed without
prejudice on February 5. 1990. The only plaintiff that appealed
that order of dismissal was Evelyn Muir.

The defendants cross

appealed contending the case should have been dismissed with
prejudice against all plaintiffs, but that cross appeal has been
dropped.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
EVELYN MUIR,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
vs.
W. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., a
New Mexico corporation and
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New
Jersey corporation,

Case No. 900100

Defendants, Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE APACHE NITROGEN PRODUCTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court does not have jurisdiction.

Evelyn Muir appeals

from orders which dismiss only some plaintiffs.

The claims of

plaintiff Douglas Bailey are currently pending.

The orders

appealed from are not "final" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The plaintiff appeals from two orders.

The first is an

order which dismissed the first action, civil number 5719, without prejudice.

The second is an order which dismissed the claims

of some plaintiffs in the second action, civil number 5873, with
prejudice and the claims of some plaintiffs without prejudice.
At least some of the claims dismissed without prejudice are still
pending in the trial court.

Neither of the orders were certified

as final pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

The

plaintiff did not seek leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
Has plaintiff appealed from a final, appealable order?
Whether there is a final, appealable order appears to be an
issue of this court's jurisdiction.

As such, this court must

independently assess whether it has jurisdiction.

See, E.o.,

Allen Steel Co. v, Crossroads Plaza Assocs., 119 Utah Adv. Rep.
6, 9 (Utah 1989); Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d
960, 964 (Utah 1986).
2.

After the Complaint was filed in civil number 5719

copies of the Summons and Complaint were given to a court runner
employed the law firm representing plaintiffs.

In order for a

Summons to be "issued" it must be given to a qualified person for
purposes of service.

Under former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

4(d) a party is not qualified.

Is the attorney for a party or

the employee of that attorney qualified?
This is an issue of law.

The trial court's conclusions of

law are reviewed for correctness.

E.Q., City of West Jordan v.

Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988).
3.
service.

The court runner was instructed to "hold off" on
Consistent with those instructions, no effort was made

to serve either defendant for more than ten months following the
filing of the Complaint.

Then, counsel for plaintiffs asked the

runner to forward the Summons and Complaint to process servers in
New Jersey and New Mexico.

Did the trial court error in finding
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the Summons had not been placed in the hands of a qualified
person for purpose of service within three months as required by
former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)?
Apache's motion to dismiss was brought in part pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

This court has held that

findings of fact which support a Rule 41(b) order of dismissal
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

E.g.. Lemon v.

Coates. 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); Wessel v. Erickson
Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985).
4.

The second action, civil number 5873, was filed after

the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death expired.
The trial court ruled that when the plaintiff failed to issue the
Summons within three months, the action was not "commenced within
due time" within the meaning of the savings statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-40. The trial court, therefore, dismissed the
wrongful death claims with prejudice.

Did the court err?

This issue involves the interpretation of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the savings statute, which are questions of
law.
STATUTES AND RULES
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be
signed and issued by the plaintiff or his attorney. A
summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in
the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of
service. Separate summonses may be issued and served.
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(b) Time of issuance and pervlce. If an action
is commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons must
issue thereon within three months from the date of such
filing* The summons must be served within one year
after the filing of the complaint or the action will be
deemed dismissed, provided that in any action brought
against two or more defendants in which personal
service has been obtained upon one of them within the
year, the other or others may be served or appear at
any time before trial.
Former U.R.Civ.P. 4.
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
Utah Code Ann- § 78-12-40 (1953).
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or Involving
multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief
is presented in an action/ whether as a claim# counterclaim, cross-claim/ or third-party claim/ and/or when
multiple parties are involved/ the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision/ however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties/ and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
U.R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 5, 1986# Wallace Muir and Douglas Bailey were
searching for a fabled Spanish gold mine in the mountains of
Duchesne County.

They were blasting a tunnel with dynamite,

ammonium nitrate (an explosive) and fuse.

Bailey was lighting

between 25 and 30 separate fuses by hand.

Each of the fuses was

attached to a stick of dynamite that was at the back of a four
foot deep hole in the face of the rock.
with ammonium nitrate.

Each hole was filled

Muir was standing nearby.

After all but

the last charge had been lit, an explosion occurred.
received blast injuries to his back.

Bailey

Wallace Muir died of

suffocation.
The plaintiffs allege the blast occurred prematurely because
the fuse manufactured by Apache and sold by Burt burned too fast.
The defendants deny there was anything wrong with the fuse. They
claim the accident occurred because Bailey and Muir lit too many
individual short fuses by hand and otherwise used outdated and
unsafe methods of blasting.
The original Complaint, civil number 5719, was filed by the
law firm of Hanson and Anderson on September 1, 1988, four days
before the two year wrongful death statute of limitations, Utah
Code Ann. S 78-12-28(2) (1953), expired.

(Rl.l) (to avoid

confusion, the record in civil number 5719 will be designated Rl.
The record in civil number 5873 will be designated R2.).
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On July 6, 1989 Burt was served in Moab, Utah by the Grand
County Sheriffs office.

(R1.16).

The Summons and Complaint had

been received by the Grand County Sheriff on July 5, 1989.
(R1.16).
On July 12, 1989 Apache was served in Hunterdon County, New
Jersey by the Hunterdon County Sheriff.

(R1.33).

The Summons

was stamped indicating it had been received by the Hunterdon
sheriff on July 10, 1989.

(R1.34).

The defendants each filed motions to dismiss because the
summons had not been issued within three months after the filing
of the Complaint as required by Rules 4(a) and (b). (R1.22, 44).
Even before the defendants filed their motions plaintiffs
filed the affidavit of Steven F. Jackson.

The affidavit stated

that the summons had been delivered to Mr. Jackson "for purpose
of service."

(Rl. 20). Because the affidavit was conclusory in

nature, the Summons had not been served in more than ten months,
and the Summons was not served by Mr. Jackson, the defendants
each moved to extend the time for their reply in order to depose
Mr. Jackson.

(R1.57, 76).

Despite plaintiffs' opposition, the court granted the
extension of time to allow the deposition of Jackson to be taken.
(R1.74, 94).
Mr. Jackson testified in deposition that he was employed by
the law firm of Hanson and Anderson.

(Jackson depo., p. 7) (The

deposition of Steven Jackson was published, R1.203, and is part
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of the record, but was not paginated.)•

Jackson was handed the

Summons and Complaint by Mr. Schwartz# plaintiff's former counsel
and an attorney with Hanson and Anderson, and instructed to "hold
off" on serving them.

(Jackson depo.,pp. 42-43, 50-51).

Mr. Jackson understood he was to do nothing about serving the
Summons and Complaint until he received further Instructions.
(Jackson depo., p. 60-63).

He never received further instruc-

tions until he was contacted by Mr. Copier in July, 1989.
(Jackson depo., p. 51). When Copier contacted Jackson in July,
1989, Copier asked Mr. Jackson what the charge would be if
Jackson served the Summons and Complaint on Burt in Moab.
charge was too high.

The

Instead, copies of the summons and com-

plaint were sent to the Hunterdon County sheriff and the Grand
County sheriff for service.

The cover letters that accompanied

the copies of the Summons and Complaint are signed by Mr. Copier.
(Jackson depo., pp. 51-54).
After the deposition of Jackson was taken, and reply memoranda were filed by the defendants, plaintiff filed the affidavit
of Mr. Schwartz.

Paragraph 6 of that affidavit confirms Schwartz

M

asked him [Jackson] to hold off on service. . . ••• (R1.159,

f 6).
On November 27, 1989, more than a month before the trial
court ruled on the motions to dismiss, plaintiffs filed civil
number 5873. (R2.1).
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On January, 5# 1990, the trial court issued a written
ruling, finding that the summons had not been issued within three
months as required by Rule 4. The court indicated it would enter
an order dismissing the first Complaint, civil number 5719.
(Rl.203-205).
On January 25, 1990, Apache was served with the second
Complaint, civil number 5873.

(R2.62).

On February 5, 1990,

Apache filed a motion to dismiss the second Complaint, civil
number 5873. (R2.35).
(R2.98).

Defendant Burt filed a similar motion.

On February 22, the plaintiff served Apache with an

Amended Complaint in civil number 5873 without first obtaining
leave to do so.

(R2.111).

The Complaint in civil number 5873 is

identical to the Amended Complaint, except that the Amended
Complaint in civil number 5873 starts with a recitation that the
case is filed under the savings statute, Utah Code Ann.
S 78-12-40. Apache moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint as
well.

(R2.77).

The order dismissing the first Complaint, civil number 5719,
without prejudice was signed on February 5, 1990.
Plaintiff Evelyn Muir appealed that order.

(R1.258).

(R1.260).

On March 16, 1990, the trial court ruled on Apache's motion
to dismiss in civil number 5873.

The court found that the second

action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The

court ruled that the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. 5 78-12-40
did not apply.

Because the plaintiffs had not followed through
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to see that the Summons and Complaint were timely issued, the
first action had not be "commenced timely" within the meaning of
the savings statute,

(R2.132-134).

On April 2, 1990 the order

dismissing the wrongful death claims against Apache with prejudice and the personal Injury claims without prejudice was signed.
(R2.166-67).

Plaintiff has appealed that order.

(R2.191).

On June 15, 1990, Douglas Bailey filed a Complaint in the
Third Judicial District Court, civil number 900903526PI.
A).

(Appen.

The venue in that case was then transferred to Grand County

and assigned the civil number 90-5997. (Appen. B). That case is
still pending and the parties have agreed that any discovery
taken in that case can be used in civil number 5873 or civil
number 5719 in the event of reversal.

(Appen. C ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The plaintiff has not appealed a final order.

The dismissal of some, but not all claims, or some, but not
all parties, is not a final order unless the trial court makes an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
an express direction for the entry of judgment.
54(b).

U.R.Civ.P.

The claims of Douglas Bailey are still pending before the

district court.

The plaintiff never sought or received the

express direction and determination required by Rule 54(b).
The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to prevent piecemeal and multiple appeals in the same matter.

Multiple appeals consume addi-

tional resources and time of the court and the parties.
-9-

There is

little point in deciding issues on appeal that may become moot
later as the result of decisions made in the trial court. That
is exactly the situation with this case.
II.

Apache did not waive its right to Insist on compliance
with Rules 4(a)

and

4(b).

Plaintiff claims that when jurisdictional defenses are
raised with nonjurisdictional defenses, a general appearance has
been made, and jurisdictional defenses are waived.

This is

patently inconsistent with Rule 12(b), which states that "[n]o
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more
other defenses or objections.,f
III.

The Summons was not issued in three months.
A.

Plaintiff's claim that the summons was given to
Steven Jackson for purpose of service is
frivolous.

Prior to April 1, 1990, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)
stated:

n

A summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in

the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service."
Assuming that Mr. Jackson was qualified, he certainly was
not given the summons for the purpose of service.
dispute.

There is no

Jackson was told to "hold off on service."

Rule 4 is

not satisfied when the summons and complaint are given to another
for storage!

Rule 4 is not satisfied by some secret, subjective

intent of counsel that someday, perhaps, the process server
should take steps to perfect service.

Nor is it satisfied by the

attorney's subjective hope to comply with Rule 4.
-10-

The Rule should be given a reasonable interpretation,
consistent with ordinary, common understanding of the terms used
and the purposes of Rules 4(a) and 4(b).
B.

Mr. Jackson was not "Qualified" within the meaning
of Rule 4,

As of April 1, 1990, it is clear that an attorney of a party
is not qualified to serve process.

If an attorney cannot serve

process, neither can the attorney's employees.
Prior to April 1, 1990, Rule 4(d) defined those qualified to
serve proces as including persons "over the age of 21 years, and
not a party to the action. . . . "
Throughout the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the term
"party" is often used to mean both the party and the attorney
representing that party.

For example, Rule 5 requires that

copies of all documents filed with the court be served upon "each
of the parties."
attorneys.

It has always been the practice to serve only

Service upon the attorney is service upon the party.

Similarly, service by the attorney is service by the party.
A prohibition against attorneys or their employees serving
process is the interpretation most consistent with the purposes
for having disinterested persons serve process, as this case
graphically illustrates.

The potential for gutter service and

other abuses is simply too great under any other rule.
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IV.

The trial court was correct in ruling that the savings
statute did not apply.

The savings statute, Utah Code Ann, S 78-12-40 by its term
applies only when the "action is commenced within due time."
The trial court correctly ruled that when the plaintiff files a
complaint days before the statute runs, the action is "commenced
within due time" within the meaning of the statute only if the
plaintiff also follows up to see that issuance of the summons and
service are performed on time as required by Rules 4(a) and 4(b).
Filing the complaint tolls the statute of limitations only
conditionally.
A.

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the background and history of
Rules 3 and Rule 4.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is modeled
after, and similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3. The
drafters of the federal rule expressly recognized there was an
unanswered question whether the mere filing of a complaint tolls
a statute of limitation, or whether any further step is required,
such as delivery of the summons and complaint for service, or
service of the summons and complaint.
The differences between federal rules 3 and 4, and Utah
Rules 3 and 4 appear to be an attempt by the Utah Supreme Court
to answer the question left unanswered by the United States
Supreme Court.

Utah Rule 3 requires that if an action is com-

menced by service, a copy must be filed within 10 days or "the
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action thus commenced shall be deemed dismissed."

The use of the

terms "deemed dismissed" suggest the action is dismissed, fib
initio and was never properly commenced.

Rule 4 uses this same

language.
B.

Plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute
of limitations and the savings statute, and also
fundamental rules of statutory construction.

This court has repeatedly recognized and relied upon the
following rules of statutory construction:
1.

Statutes must be interpreted in light of their purpose;

and
2.

Statutes pari materia should be construed in harmony

with each other.
The fundamental purpose of a statute of limitations is to
insure timely notice to defendants so they can assemble a defense
while the facts are still fresh.

A statute of limitations pre-

vents stale claims.
The savings statute was intended to compliment the statutes
of limitations.

If and when the purpose of the statue of limi-

tation has been met, i.e., the defendant has received timely
notice, then the plaintiff should get an additional period of
time to refile if the action is dismissed other than on the
merits.
Instead of complimenting the statute of limitations, the
plaintiffs' interpretation of the savings statute completely
defeats the statute of limitations.
-13-

C

Plaintiff's Interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the purpose for Rules 4(al
and 4 lb) and renders these rules meaningless.

Rules 4(a) and 4(b) were Intended to assure the case, once
filed, proceeds at some minimum pace. Under the interpretation
proposed by plaintiff, these rules, in conjunction with the
savings statute greatly enhance delay.
D.

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the legislative history of
the statute and puts the statute in conflict with
Rules 3 and 4,

Clearly, the savings statute and the rules of civil procedure must be interpreted in harmony with one another.

The

legislature did not intend to interfere with the operation of the
rules of civil procedure, nor did it have the power to do so.
Similarly, this court did not intend for any conflict between the
Rule and statutes.

Under plaintiff's interpretation, Rules 3 and

4 render the statutes of limitation meaningless and the savings
statute renders Rule 4 meaningless.

Such conflict must be

avoided by reasonable interpretation.
E.

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with cases from other courts which
interpret similar rules.

A number of courts have rules like Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 3 which state that an action is commenced by the filing
of the complaint.

These courts have ruled the filing of the

complaint tolls the statute of limitations only conditionally.
If the plaintiff does not follow up with prompt issuance of the
summons and service, the statute is not tolled by the filing of
-14-

the complaint, despite the language that the case is commenced by
filing the complaint.
F-

The Plaintiffs interpretation of the rules and
the savings statute is inconsistent with Ideals of
eoual protection and evenhanded justice.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to provide a
just speedy and inexpensive determination of actions.

ff

Justice"

implies equal application of the law and evenhandedness.
A defendant is subject to default judgment for the full
amount of the prayer if an answer or motion to dismiss is not
filed in 20 days.

This is not harsh or unjust.

The court must

have rules and must insist upon the parties moving the case along
to completion.
along.

The plaintiff is also required to move the case

She had three months to simply get the summons to a

process server and give instructions to serve it.

She had an

additional nine months to see that it was actually served.

If

the plaintiff is not only excused from this requirement, but
given additional time under the statute of limitations for her
failure to follow the rules, the goal of a just and speedy
conclusion will not be realized.
V.

Plaintiff waived claims that the trial court should
have held a hearing and claims that the savings statute
is unconstitutional.

Local rules required plaintiff to request a hearing if she
wanted one, otherwise hearing was waived.
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Plaintiff not only

failed to request a hearing she affirmatively asked the court to
decide the matters without hear.
Plaintiff now raises an oblique reference to the savings
statute being unconstitutional. That issue was not sufficiently
raised in the trial court to preserve it for appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT APPEALED A FINAL ORDER.
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION.
Under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
appeals of right can only be taken from "final orders and
judgments."
in 1985.

This rule replaced Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 72

The purpose and policy of Rule 3 is the same as the

previous Rule 72, which this court described as follows:
Article VIII, S 9 of the Utah Constitution and Rule
72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide for
appeals to this Court from all final orders and judgments from district court. The policy underlying these
provisions is sound. In the first place, it promotes
judicial economy by preventing piecemeal appeals in the
same litigation to this Court. At least some appeals
would ultimately never be taken, since the party
aggrieved by an interlocutory order may, in the end,
prevail. Also, expense to litigants and the judiciary
is reduced by the general requirement that all issues
be appealed in one procedure. Further, the final
judgment rule prevents this Court from intermeddling in
the business of the trial courts before they have had
opportunity to rectify some of their own possible
misjudgments and before they have completed the trial.
Finally, the final judgment rule prevents the interminable protraction of lawsuits. In a day when the
case load of this Court has risen astronomically and
seriously strains our resources, there is even additional reason for applying the final judgment rule.
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Kennedy v. New Era Indust., Inc.. 600 P*2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979).
This court continues to refer to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) for the definition of what is a final order;
Rule 54(b) authorizes a trial court In cases involving
multiple claims or multiple parties to direct the entry
of a final judgment, before all issues have been settled, as to some of the claims or some of the parties
upon a finding that "there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." A strong reason supporting this rule is that
the trial court, having an overview of the total
litigation, is in a position to determine whether such
an order would promote efficiency, serve the ends of
justice, and save this Court from having to deal with
the same or similar issues in a piecemeal fashion.
Id., at 536.
This case is controlled by Steck v. Aaaaire, 789 P.2d 708
(Utah 1990).

In Steck, three wrongful death cases arising out of

the same helicopter crash were consolidated.

The trial court

granted one defendant summary judgment as to the claims of the
heirs of two victims.

This court said:

Because the judgment appealed does not dispose of
all claims of all parties in the consolidated case, it
does not constitute a final judgment, and this court
has no jurisdiction to review it.
Id., at 709.
In the case at bar, the claims of Douglas Bailey arising
from the same accident are being actively pursued against both
defendants in the trial court.

A judgement on the merits against

Bailey that the fuse in question was not defective and/or did not
proximately cause the explosion would moot the claims of Muir. A
final judgment is binding upon parties and those in privity with
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them.

E.g., Det>t. of Social Services v. Ruscetta* 742 P.2d 114,

116 (Utah App. 1987).

This "foster[s] judicial economy by

preventing redundant litigation."

I£.

"In the context of res

judicata, a person "in privity" is one so identified in interest
with another that the same legal rights are represented."

Id.,

at 117. Clearly, plaintiff Muir is a party and in privity.
brought her claim at the same time, in the same actions.
relies upon the same witnesses and theories.
counsel.

She

She

She hired the same

There is simply little point in subjecting the parties

to the expense of an appeal which may not be necessary.
POINT II
APACHE DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO INSIST ON
COMPLIANCE WITH RULES 4(a) and 4(b).
Apache filed its motion to dismiss, and supporting memorandum and affidavit, in civil number 5719 on August 14, 1989.
(R1.44).

On month later Apache served a subpoena duces tecum and

noticed up a records deposition for the state medical examiner.
(R1.91).

The notice made it clear that if the records were pro-

duced prior to the deposition, the witness would not be required
to attend.

(R1.92).

Apache did this to confirm the alleged date

of Kr. Muir's death for purposes of calculating exactly when the
statute of limitations had run.
Citing only the rules of baseball in

support of her posi-

tion, plaintiff claims this limited discovery, the defendants'
request for dismissal on the merits and the filing of a cross
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appeal by the defendants was a general appearance and consent to
the court's jurisdiction! and a waiver of any right to insist
upon compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

As the

plaintiff puts it, the defendants can take a walk, i.e., they can
raise jurisdictional defenses (enter a special appearance), or
they can swing, i.e., raise nonjurisdictional defenses (enter a
general appearance).

They can not do both.

The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly held that
the language of Rule 12(b) was specifically intended to allow the
joinder of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses and
abolish the distinctions between special and general appearances:
The doctrines of "general" and "special" appearance,
relied on by the court, are associated with personal
jurisdiction only. Prior to the adoption of Rule 12(b)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party was required
to allege lack of personal jurisdiction and other
jurisdictional defects separately from other nonjurisdictional defenses. f,[I]f a challenge of this type was
joined with any nonjurisdictional defenses, the appearance became 'general1 and the party's right to object
to jurisdiction was waived." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure S 1362 (1969). Today
the distinction between general and special appearances
has been effectively abolished by Rule 12(b), which
permits jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses
to be joined.
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 725-26 n. 17 (Utah App. 1990).
The distinction between general and special appearances
has been abolished by Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Brown & Associates/Inc. v. Carnes Corp..
Utah, 547 P.2d 206 (1976). A party need no longer
appear "specially" to attack the court's jurisdiction,
and, conversely, a general appearance does not waive
the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
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A person may challenge jurisdiction over his
person in his answer and also assert defenses going to
the merits without losing the jurisdictional claim.
Alternatively, a defendant may raise his defenses in a
motion prior to his answer.
Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc.. 627 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981)
(Justice Stewart concurring)(citations omitted).
While plaintiffs position may be supported by rules of
baseball, it is patently inconsistent with the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rule 12(b) states:

No defense or objection is waived by being joined with
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after
the denial of such motion or objection.
A party may raise an objection to service in an answer or
motion, along with any other defenses. When a party raises a
defense by motion, that party is by definition asking the court
to dismiss at least a portion of the claims, either with or
without prejudice.

An answer, by definition means the defendant

denies either responsibility and/or the damages alleged, usually
both.

By definition, an answer demands that at least a portion

of the claims be dismissed with prejudice.

Having preserved the

defense, by either motion or answer, the defendant may proceed to
defend the claims on the merits!
Litigation is not baseball.

The rules of baseball were

designed to test the athletic prowess and strategy skills of
contestants for purposes of entertaining players and spectators.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were designed "to secure the
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just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
U.R.Civ.P.l.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THAT THE SUMMONS WAS ISSUED
IN THREE MONTHS IS WITHOUT MERIT.
A.

Plaintiff's claim that the Summons was given to Steven
Jackson for purpose of service is frivolous.

Prior to April 1, 1990, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)
stated:

"A summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in

the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service."
Assuming for a moment that Mr. Jackson was qualified, he
certainly was not given the summons for the purpose of service.
There is no dispute.

Mr. Jackson was handed copies of the

summons and complaint and told to hold off on service:
Q

(BY MS. PORTER) All right, I'd like to go through
the chronology on these particular documents. And
when I say these particular documents, I'm referring to the summons with complaints that you say
that you received on October 19th, 1988, in the
Muir case.

A

Okay.

Q

How did you receive those?

A

How?

Q

Uh-huh.

A

Mr. Schwartz gave them to me.

Q

Personally?

A

Yeah, he handed them to me.

Q

Were there any written notes or instructions with
them?
-21-

A

No.

Q

What did Mr. Schwartz tell you with respect to
these summons with complaints?

A

I think he told me to hold off for a little bit.

Q

Did he give you any date or deadline as to when he
wanted you to try to get them served?

A

No.

Q

What, then, did you do with these documents?

A

I just kept them there by my desk.

Q

Do you have a place that you keep things that
aren't, or that don't require immediate attention?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

So you put them somewhere on your desk?

A

Yeah, I set them aside.

Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 42-43.
0
You mentioned that Mr. Schwartz told you to hold
off for a while.
A

Yeah, that's all he told me.

Q

Was that the gist of the conversation, or was that
exactly what he said?

A

That was what he told me. He handed it to me and
said, "Hold off for a while."

Q

Had he done that before on occasion, attorneys had
handed that to you and said, "Hold off for a
while"?

A

He hadn't, but other attorneys have.

Q

Okay, what does that mean to you?
you get further word?

A

Yeah.
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Hold off until

Q

Okay. And do they sometimes come back and say,
"Never mind, we've settled the case"?

A

That's happened before, yeah.

Q

Do they sometimes come back and say, "Never mind,
I'll get somebody else to serve it"?

A

Yeah, and then they'll give it to, I guess a
process server. Is that what they do full time?
A constable, I guess you'd call them.

Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 50-51.
Jackson received no further instructions until July, 1989
when he was contacted by Robert Copier.
Q

All right. And you don't recall any conversation
with Mr. Schwartz about the summons and complaint
after October of '88 until Mr. Copier called?

A

No.

Q

And tell me again when Mr. Copier called?

Q

I don't remember exactly when, but it was probably
the first part of the month.

Q

July, 1989?

A

(No audible answer.)

0

You have to answer audibly.

A

Yeah.

Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, p. 51.
In July 1989, Mr. Copier called Jackson and asked how much
it would cost to have Jackson serve defendant Burt.

The expense

was too great and Mr. Copier chose not to have Jackson serve the
summons and complaint.

Instead, Mr. Copier sent Jackson cover

letters and stamped envelopes addressed to the sheriff's offices
in Hunterdon County, New Jersey and Grand County, Utah.
-23-

Jackson's only role in forwarding the summons and complaint for
service was to drop them in the stamped and addressed envelopes
that were provided by Copier, seal them and place them in the
mail.

Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 51-54.

Had Schwartz intended Jackson to serve the summons and
complaint on Apache in New Jersey, or Burt in Moab he would have
made travel arrangements for Jackson, which he did not do:
Q

. . . Have you ever been handed a summons and
complaint before, and then later discovered that
it needed to be served out of state?

A

No.

Q

If that had happened to you, what would your
response be typically, if you can't get somebody
served?

A

Say that again.

Q

In other words, if someone gave you a summons and
complaint to serve out of state, what would you do
with that, typically? Go back and ask the attorney how you accomplish that?

A

Yeah, if they really wanted me to serve it. I
guess I'd have to make arrangements to do it.

Q

Okay. You didn't do that with Mr. Schwartz in
this case, did you?

A

What do you mean?

Q

You didn't go back and ask him how you were supposed to serve Apache Powder in New Jersey, did
you?

A

I don't recall that, no.

Q

Okay. Well, do you think you may have said that,
and don't recall it?

A

No.

I usually look at them when I get them.
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Q

Or you1re pretty sure you didn't go ask him how to
serve Apache in New Jersey?

A

Ifm pretty sure,

I donft remember New Jersey.

Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 57*59 (emphasis added).
Rule 4(b) should be given a reasonable interpretation
consistent with ordinary, common understanding of the terms used.
The proces server must be given instructions to promptly serve
the Summons and Complaint, and the instructions and information
necessary to accomplish that goal. The rule is not satisfied
when the summons and complaint are given to another for storage.
The rule is not satisfied by some secret, subjective intent of
counsel that someday, perhaps, the process server should take
steps to perfect service.

Nor is it satisfied by the attorney's

subjective hope to comply with Rule 4.
Any other interpretation would defeat the purposes of Rules
4(a) and 4(b), which are:
1.

To assure that once an action is filed, the defendant

receives reasonably prompt notice. The plaintiff is not the only
party with an interest in the timely conclusion of litigation.
While the complaint is on file, it is a matter of public record.
As such it can impair the good name and credit of the defendant,
particularly when it goes unanswered.
2.
tations.

To assure the intended operation of statutes of limiThis court has repeatedly held:

[T]he policies behind statutes of limitations are "to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
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until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared."
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America. Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161
(Utah 1989)(quoting Meyers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah
1981)(quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc..

321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944))).

If, as plaintiff

argues, a plaintiff could toll the statute of limitations by
filing a complaint and doing nothing else, the salutary policies
of the statutes of limitations would be defeated.

It is not

until the defendant has notice that he can gather evidence and
interview witnesses.

That is why courts have routinely held that

the fundamental purpose of a statute of limitations is to insure
timely notice to an adverse party so that he or she may assemble
a defense while the facts are still fresh.

E.Q., Elkins v.

Derby. 12 Cal.3d 410, 115 Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81, 83 (Cal.
1974) (en banc).
3.

To see that the plaintiff diligently proceeds with an

action once it is filed.

This is in keeping with the fundamental

purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as announced by
Rule 1, the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action.

The idea of a just determination of disputes without

rules which set an orderly procedure for notice and response, and
which set at least some time limitations is absurd.

A rule that

dictates judgment against defendants who do not answer in a
limited period of time is not harsh or unjust, to the contrary,
it is a requirement of a system of orderly and efficient dispute
-26-

resolution.

Similarly it Is not harsh or unfair to require

plaintiff to proceed with some very minimum dispatch.
plaintiff chooses to be before the court.

The

The plaintiff chooses

to invoke the power of the state. The plaintiff chooses to
consume the public's funds to resolve private disputes. The
plaintiff chooses to hail defendants from hundreds, even
thousands of miles into court.

The plaintiff chooses to require

defendants to incur great expense and suffer considerable inconvenience/ without any prior review by anyone and without first
having to present one shred of evidence.
great power.

The plaintiff is given

It is not harsh or unjust to require that the

plaintiff exercise that power with some minimal responsibility
and proceed in a minimally timely fashion.
B

*

Mr. Jackson was not "Qualified" within the meaning
of Rule 4.

As of April 1, 1990, it is clear that an attorney of a party
is not qualified to serve process.

If an attorney cannot serve

process, neither can the attorney's employee.
Prior to April 1. 1990, Rule 4(d) defined those qualified to
serve process as including persons "over the age of 21 years, and
not a party to the action."

In many portions of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, the term "party" is used to mean both the
party and the attorney representing that party.

For example,

Rule 5 requires that copies of all documents filed with the court
be served upon "each of the parties."
practice to serve only attorneys.
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It has always been the

Service upon the attorney is

service upon the party.

Similarly, service feyt h e attorney is

service by; the party.
The due process clauses of the United States Constitution
and the Utah Constitution require personal service before the
court can exercise power over a defendant.

Due process also

requires some minimum assurance that personal service has In fact
taken place.

That appears to be the reason that a return of

process is required to be sworn.

This minimum assurance requires

that the process server be objective, thus parties cannot serve
process.
When compared with parties, attorneys and their employees
may have as much or more interest in service.

As this case

graphically illustrates, when an employee of a law firm is questioned about service, there may be tremendous pressure to testify
in a manner to please the employer.

Here, Mr. Jackson signed an

affidavit that he was given the summons "for purpose of service."
In reality, he was told not to serve the summons and complaint.
The affidavit is false, plain and simple.
This court should reject a very narrow, formalistic and literal interpretation of the former rule, or the present rule for
that matter.

The rules should be given an interpretation consis-

tent with its policies and purposes.

The potential for gutter

service and other abuses is simply too great under any other
interpretation.

Any other interpretation may be insufficient to

meet due process requirements.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
SAVINGS STATUTE DID NOT APPLY.
The first words of the savings statute, Utah Code Ann.
S 78-12-40, are: "If an action is commenced in due time."
Commencement of an action within due time within the meaning of
the statute is the first and foremost requirement for the application of the statute, yet the statute does not define when an
action is commenced within due time. The trial court correctly
ruled that when the plaintiff files a complaint days before the
statute runs, the action is commenced within due time within the
meaning of the statute only if the plaintiff also follows up to
see that issuance of the summons and service are performed on
time as required by Rule 4.
A.

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the background and history of
Rules 3 and 4,

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were modeled after, and
are similar to, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Utah

Supreme Court has long held that it is appropriate to look to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when interpreting the state
rules of civil procedure.

E.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765,

767 n.2 (Utah 1980); Wineoar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 Utah 487,
252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953).

The drafters of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure recognized there was an unanswered question as to
whether the mere filing of the complaint with the clerk's office
tolls a statute of limitation, or, whether any further step was
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required, such as delivery of the summons and complaint for
service, or service of the summons and complaint:
When a federal or state statute of limitations is
pleaded as a defense, a question may arise under this
rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the
running of the statute, or whether any further step is
required, such as, service of the summons and complaint
or their delivery to the marshal1 for service. The
answer to this question may depend on whether it is
competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power
to makes rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations. The requirement of Rule 4(a) that the clerk
shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it to the
marshall for service will reduce the chances of such a
question arising.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
S 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 3, p. 200 (West 1916).
Whether the filing of the complaint or the issuance of
the summons by the clerk or the actual service of the
summons constitutes a "commencement" of the action, to
stop the running of the Statute of Limitations, is a
problem which presented itself to the Advisory
Committee, but was unanswered. It would seem, however,
that the filing of the complaint conditionally suspends
the running of the Statute of Limitations, provided the
summons is issued forthwith and served within a reasonable time thereafter.
Id. (quoting 8 Brooklyn L.Rev. 188).
It is apparent from a comparison of the Federal and Utah
rules that Utah Rules 3 and 4 were drafted to answer this very
question.

Utah Rule 3 requires that if an action is commenced by

service, a copy must be filed within ten days or "the action thus
commenced shall be deemed dismissed."

The use of the terms

"deemed dismissed" suggest that an action is commenced by service
only conditionally, and only if the plaintiff follows up and
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files the complaint with the clerk's office within ten days.
Rule 4 also uses the terms "deemed dismissed.9*

Again, the use of

the terms "deemed dismissed** suggest that commencing an action by
filing a complaint with the clerk's office tolls the statute of
limitations only if the plaintiff follows up and issues and
serves the complaint as required by Rule 4(a) and 4(b).
B.

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute
of limitations and the saving statute, and also
fundamental rules of statutory construction.

Statutes must be interpreted in light of their purpose:
[T]he fundamental consideration in interpreting statutes is legislative intent; and that is determined in
light of the purpose the statute was designed to
achieve.
Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983).

Again, the purpose of statutes of

limitations is to give defendants notice of claims against them
before memories fade, evidence is lost and witnesses disappear.
The savings statute and the statutes of limitations are part
of the same title and chapter.
matter.

They deal with the same subject

As such they are in pari materia.

This court has long

held that statutes In pari materia should be construed in harmony
with each other.
(Utah 1983).
tions.

E.g., Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318

The savings statute compliments statutes of limita-

When the purposes of the statute of limitations have been

met, that is to say, when the defendant has received timely
notice, then if the case is dismissed without prejudice, the
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plaintiff should have additional time to bring the action again.
The language in the savings statute "if any action is commenced
within due time" should be interpreted as intended: "if the
purpose and policy of the statute of limitations has been met."
The savings statute applies only when the plaintiff has filed the
complaint on time and in addition issued and served it on time.
Any other interpretation of the savings statute would allow
the savings statute to completely defeat the salutary policies
behind the statutes of limitation.

Here the plaintiff filed the

complaint days before the statute ran and then waited more than
ten months before making any effort to have the complaint served.
Under the plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the savings
statute, if it pleased the plaintiff she could have waited years
more.

When the court finally dismissed the complaint without

prejudice, she could wait an additional year before filing a new
complaint.

She could wait three months more before issuing the

summons and nine months more before service was perfected.

She

could stretch the statute of limitations several years.
What if in the second action filed she again waited many
months or years more than the three before issuing the complaint?
The savings statute does not by its literal language distinguish
between the first time an action is commenced and the second.
Unless this court is willing to give the savings statute a
reasonable interpretation consistent with the policy and purpose
of the statute, the plaintiff could extent the statute of
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limitations, never once giving notice to the defendants, for
literally many, many years. During the delay memories will fade,
evidence will be lost, witnesses will become unavailable.

What a

great tactical tool for a plaintiff who would like to wait to
present his or her evidence until particular unfavorable evidence
is no longer available.
C

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
is inconsistent with the purposes of Rule 4 and
renders these rules meaningless.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are just that—rules.
They are not suggestions.

They are not advisory.

They are

rules:
Although the New Rules of Civil Procedure were
intended to provide liberality in procedure, it is
nevertheless expected that they will be followed, and
unless reasons satisfactory to the court are advanced
as the basis for relief from complying with them,
parties will not be excused from so doing.
C.M.C. Cassitv, Inc. v. Aird, 707 P.2d 1304, 1305 (Utah 1985).
Under the plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute,
former Rules 4(a) and 4(b) become mere suggestions.

So does the

new Rule 4(b). These rules were intended to assure that the
defendant receives reasonably prompt notice, that the purposes of
the statute of limitations are met and assure that the action
plaintiff chose to start is moved along with reasonable dispatch.
In short, the rules, old and new, were intended to minimized
delay.

Under plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute,

delay would be enhanced, not minimized.
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D.

Plaintiff's Interpretation of the savings statute
creates a conflict between Rules 3 and 4 and the
savings statute.

When this court promulgated the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, it did not intend that there be any conflict with any
statutes. Rule 1(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of
no further force and effect.
Nor did the legislature intend any conflict. The savings
statute in question was part of the 1943 code.

In 1951, that

provision was repealed and re-enacted as part of House Bill No.
31.

1951 Utah Laws, Ch. 58, S 104-12-40, p. 188.

In re-enacting

the statute, the legislature made it clear that the statute was
being reenacted only so far as it was not inconsistent with the
recently adopted rules of civil procedure:
Section 1. Title 20 and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated
1943, as amended, and Chapters 19, 33 and 34, Laws of
Utah 1943; Chapters 3 and 10, Laws of Utah 1947; and
Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1949, insofar as the same have
not been superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah, are
hereby revised, codified and re-enacted into law as
"The Judicial Code" under Title 104, as follows:
1951 Utah Laws, Ch. 58, p. 150-51.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that courts must give
interpretations to statutes which save them from potential constitutional conflicts.

E.g., Carlson v. Bos. 740 P.2d 1269, 1976

(Utah 1987).
The Utah Constitution is modeled after the United States
Constitution.

As such, it embodies principles of separation of
-34-

powers.

The judicial branch has inherent power to promulgate

rules which govern the conduct of its business.
In 1985 the Utah State Constitution was amended to allow the
legislature to enact statutes which interfere with the rules of
civil procedure.
vote.

Such statutes require a two-thirds majority

Utah Const., Art. VIII, S 4.

Prior to this constitutional

amendment/ the legislature had no power or prerogative to enact
statutes which interfered with the rules of civil procedure.
If the plaintiff is allowed to rely upon the savings
statute, the savings statute renders Rules 4(a) and 4(b) meaningless and void.

Similarly, plaintiff's interpretation of Rule 3

would defeat the policies of the statute of limitations and the
savings statute.
Clearly the savings statute and the rules of civil procedure
must be harmonized.
E

-

Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute
and Rule 3 is inconsistent with the decisions of
other courts that have interpreted similar rules.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 3 is modeled after Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 3.

The federal rules says simply, ,f[a]n

action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." The
Utah states that an action is commenced by either filing a complaint or by service upon the defendant, followed in ten days by
filing the complaint with the court.

This court has repeatedly

held that an inspection of the federal rules is helpful in
interpreting the Utah Rules.

E.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d
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765, 767 n.2 (Utah 1980); Wlneoar v. Slim Olsen. Inc., 122 Utah
487, 252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953).

The brief of defendant Burt

discusses many federal cases that have held that simply filing
the complaint only commences the action conditionally.

Those

cases hold that if the plaintiff does not follow through and
serve the complaint in 120 days under F.R.Civ.P. 4(j) # it is as
if the case were never filed.

This court should interpret the

Utah Rules accordingly.
There are also many state courts with rules similar to Utah
Rule 3 that have held that merely filing the complaint only
conditionally commences the action.
Nevada Rule 3 states that an action is commenced by the filing of the complaint and the issuance of a summons. Nevada Rule
4 requires that the summons be issued forthwith and delivered for
service.

The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted these two

rules as tolling the statute of limitations upon filing a complaint only if the summons is immediately placed in the hands of
the sheriff with the intention that it be served in due course.
Deboer v. Fattor, 72 Nev. 316, 304 P.2d 958 (1956).
In Washington filing a complaint only tentatively tolls the
statute of limitations.

The plaintiff must also obtain proper

personal service within ninety days after filing the complaint.
Patrick v. DeYounq, 45 Wash.App. 103, 724 P.2d 1064, 1066
(Wash.App. 1986) .
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In Arizona the statute is tolled by filing a complaint, only
if, the plaintiff follows up and obtains good service within one
year following the filing of the complaint.

Peters v. M fc O

Const,, Inc., 119 Ariz. 34, 579 P.2d 72 (Ariz. App. 1978).
In Georgia, the statute of limitations is tolled by filing a
complaint, only if, the plaintiff also perfects service within
five days after filing the complaint.

Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. v. Citv of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying
Georgia law). These are by no means the only courts which have
interpreted similar rules in this manner.
F.

Plaintiff's interpretation of the rules and the
savings statute is inconsistent with equal and
evenhanded justice.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to promote
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
U.R.Civ.P. l.

"Justice" implies evenhandedness and equality.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a defendant may be
hailed into court from hundreds even thousands of miles away.

In

twenty days the defendant must hire counsel, investigate the
claims raised in the complaint, determine the defenses which must
be raised (some of which will be waived if not raised) and file
an answer.

If the defendant fails to do so, judgment may be

taken for the full amount of the prayer.

Of course Rule 6(b) and

60(b) may give the defendant some relief upon proper showing.
The justification for this is sound.

The parties must be

required to move matters along to completion.
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The defendant, however, is not the only party with some
responsibility to move the action along.

It would be incredible

and unjust, to say the least, if the plaintiff were not also
required to move matters along to completion.
two years to file a complaint.

The plaintiff had

She had three months more just to

give the summons and complaint to a process server and give that
process server instructions to get it served.

She had nine

months more than that to see that service was perfected.

She

also had the possibility of relief under Rules 6(b) and 60(b)
upon the proper showing.
Under plaintiff's interpretation, the plaintiff was not
required to move the case along by some minimum effort.

To the

contrary, the plaintiff argues she should be given more opportunity for delay.

Such a result would not even approach

evenhandedness.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF NEVER ASKED FOR A HEARING AT THE
TRIAL COURT OR RAISED THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE SAVINGS STATUTE. THESE ISSUES WERE NOT
PRESERVED.
Claims of error may not be raised the first time on appeal.
The trial court must be given an opportunity to address and
correct claims of error, or they are waived.

E.g., Busch Corp.

v. State Fame Fire & Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).
Plaintiff appears to argue that the trial court erred by
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing
-38-

,f

or some other hearing" to

determine whether summons had issued on time.

The plaintiff

simply never asked for such a hearing and cannot now complain.
Under Rule 4-501(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, district courts decide motions without hearing "unless
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in
paragraph (3)(b; or (4)" of that rule.

Rule 4-501(3)(b) allows

parties to file a written request for a ruling if the motion
would dismiss claims with prejudice.

Rule 4-501(3)(f) states

that if such a written request for hearing is not filed with the
parties* principal memoranda, "a hearing on the motion shall be
deemed waived."
Plaintiff did not request such a hearing.

To the contrary,

the plaintiff filed a written Request for Ruling in civil number
5719, asking that the motions to dismiss be decided pursuant to
Rule 4-501(3), i.e., without hearing.
the same in civil number 5873.

(Rl. 83). Plaintiff did

(R2. 145).

Plaintiff also appears to argue that the trial court's
interpretation of the savings statute violates equal protection
and the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

The

plaintiff never raised these issues at the trial level, and even
now does not seriously argue the point.
It is axiomatic that statutes are presumed to be constitutional and that the party challenging a statute's
constitutionality bears the burden of proving that it
is invalid.
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990).
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It is difficult at best to guess exactly why plaintiff
believes the court1s interpretation of the savings statute denies
her access to the courts. Apache can only conjecture as to why
the argument is not articulated.
serious about the argument.

Perhaps the plaintiff is not

Perhaps the plaintiff hopes to arti-

culate it for the first time in a reply brief, thus preventing
the defendants from effectively addressing it.
defendants are at a disadvantage.

In any event the

It may be sufficient to point

what this court has said about the open courts provision, Utah
Const. Art. I § 11:
Necessarily, the Legislature has great latitude in
defining, changing, and modernizing the law, and in
doing so may create new rules of law and abrogate old
ones.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985).
Obviously, section 11 rights also are subject to
reasonable rules of procedure for the adjudication of
these and all other right.
Id., at 677, n.5.
The Legislature clearly has a valid interest in
limiting the time within which a legal action may be
commenced once it arises.
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989).
[SJection 11 rights are not always paramount,
either. They do not sweep all other constitutional
rights and prerogatives before them. They, too, like
many constitutional rights, must be weighed against and
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. The
accommodation of competing, and sometimes clashing,
constitutional rights and prerogatives is a task of the
greatest delicacy, although a common and necessary one
in constitutional adjudication.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah 1985).
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Among these competing rights is the defendants1 right to
notice within a reasonable period of time so they can preserve
evidence and effectively prepare a defense to claims leveled
against them.
Plaintiff's equal protection claims are even more difficult
to guess at.

If a defendant delays the case by failing to file

an answer or motion to dismiss in 20 days, the court may enter
default.

It is difficult at best to understand plaintiff's claim

that failure to give her unlimited opportunity for delay discriminates against her.

If anything, plaintiff's proposed interpre-

tation of the Rules and savings statute would discriminate
against the defendants.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the orders of the district court

should be affirmed.
DATED this 10th day of December, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISTENSfitf & MARTLWEAt

m E. Draney
Attorneys for Apache/tfi^trogen
Products
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ItOBERT H. COPZEX - #737
Attorney for Plaintiff
243 Bast 400 South, Suits 200
fait Lake City, Utah §4111
Telephone: (iOl) 531-0099

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
•ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
DOUGLAS BAILEY,
Plaintiff,

1

COXPLAXMT AND JURY DEMAND

1

Civil No. 900903526P1

1

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

vs.
APACHE POWDER COMPANY,
a Hew Jersey corporation,
tf.H. BUKT EXPLOSIVES, INC.,
a New Kexico corporation, and
DOES I-X,
Defendant^

Plaintiff alleges:
1. Plaintiff Douglas Bailey (Bailey) is a cititen of the
State of Utah residing in Salt Lake County/
2. Defendant W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc., (Burt) is a
New Kexico Corporation engaged in the business of selling materials
used in blasting operations, including safety fuses. At all tines
relevant hereto, Burt did business in the State of Utah.
3. Defendant Apache Powder Company (Apache) is a New
Jersey Corporation engaged in the, business of manufacturing snd
selling materials used in blasting operations, including safety
fuses. At all times relevant hereto, Apache did business in the
State of Utah.

1
ADDENDUM A

4. Does I - X are presently unknown manufacturers,
sellers, and/or distributors of safety fuses that were ultimately
sold to Bailey and were utilised in connection with the explosion
complained of herein.
5. This court possesses jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter of this action pursuant to B.C.A. 178-3-4.
6. None of the named Defendants resides in this state
and Plaintiff has properly designated venue in this county pursuant
to U.C.A. 178-13-7.
FACTS

7. On or about August 26, 1986, Bailey purchased from
Burt various materials for use iri a blasting and mining operation
located on property owned by Wallace A. Muir and his family in
Duchesne County, Utah (Kuir Mine).
8. Among the materials purchased by Bailey from Burt was
white wax safety fuse to be used for ignition of blasting caps,
dynamite, and ammonium nitrate fuel oil (AKFO).
9. The white wax safety fuse purchased by Bailey from
Burt was, on information and belief, manufactured in whole or in
part by Apache and/or Does I - X, and sold by Apache and/or Does
I - X to Burt.
10. At the time of Bailey*s purchase, no warnings of any
kind were given to Bailey by Burt, Apache, or Does I - X concerning
characteristics of the safety fuse which could cause a premature
explosion when used in conjunction with blasting caps, dynamite,
and AKFO.
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11. Subsequent to Balley*e purchase of the safety fuse
from Burt, the fuse vas need in bleating operetlons at the Nuir
Nine by bailey and others. On information and belief, fturt knew
at the time it aold the fuae to Bailey that the fuse vaa to be used
for aaid purpose at the Muir Mine.
12. On or about September ft. It16, Bailey out several
segments of safety fuse of equal length from the fuse purchased
fro* Burt.
In cutting the safety fuae into segments, Bailey
utilised e aeasuring stick that was approxiaately five feet three
inches (5*3") in length. Bach segment of safety fuse cut by Burt
vas equal in length to the length of the stick. Bailey then
carefully attached several such segments to blasting caps and
dynamite. Bailey and Wallace A. Muir then caused the dynamite
charges prepared by Bailey to be placed inside the Nuir Mine into
four foot (4') deep holes, which were then filled with ANFO.
13. Bailey prepared a timer fuse by taking one of the
segments of epproximatly five feet three inches (5'3") in length
that had not been attached to any blasting cap and shortening that
segment for safety purposes by approximately one foot (1')* Bailey
then lit this shortened safety segment and proceeded to light the
longer segments that had been attached to blasting caps and
dynamite and placed in the four foot (4') holes. While he lit the
longer segments, Bailey used the shortened safety segment es a
timer fuse by regularly observing it to insure that there was time
left to safely exit the aine.
14. After lighting all but the last charge, Bailey's
timer fuse was atill one to two feet long, leaving hla ample time
to light the last charge and to axit aafely with Wallace A. Muir
from the sine. Suddenly, a violent axplosion caused the death of
Wallace A. Muir and serious injury to Bailey. Mario Jenkins, who
vas outside the aine at the time of the blast that killed Wallace
3

A. Muir and seriously injured Bailey, rushed Bailey to the Duchesne
County Hospital. Bailey vas transferred by ambulance to St. Mark's
Hospital in Bait Lake County where be vas hospital 1 ted for
approximately tvo (2) veeks for burns and wounds from the
explosion.

FIRST CLAIM fPR REMIT
(Products Liability)
15. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by this reference
the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 - 1 4 herein.
16. Burt, Apache, and Does Z - X, at all times relevant
hereto, were engaged in the business of selling materials utilised
in blasting, including the safety fuse ultimately purchased by
Bailey from Burt.
17. Burt, Apache, and Does I - X, expected that the
safety fuse sold by then, vhich vas ultimately purchased by Bailey
from Burt, would reach the user or consumer of the safety fuse
without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold
by Burt, Apache, and Does I - X.
18. The safety fuse sold by Burt, Apache, end Does X *
X, which was ultimately purchased by Bailey from Burt, reached the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it was sold by Burt, Apache, and Does I - X.
19. At the time Burt, Apache, and Does I • X, mold the
safety fuse which was ultimately purchased by Bailey from Burt, it
vas in a defective condition end unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer of the safety fuse, in that the burning rate of the
fuse varied substantially at different sections of the fuse and no
warning was supplied vith the fuse concerning the potential or
4

actual vide diacrapaney in burning rataa of tha fuaa.
20. Tha dafaetlva and unreasonably dangaroua aafaty fuaa
•old by Burt, Apache, and Doas I - X, proximately eauaad tha
explosion which Injured Bailey end killed Wallace A. Mulr.
21.
Plaintiff Bailey la entitled to recover from
Dafandante ell damages suatalned by hie ea e result of tha
explosion, Including but not Halted to, his past, praaant end
future medical expenses, lost earning*, hie past, preeent, end
future physical pain end suffering end mental enguish, his past,
praaant, end future eaotional diatraaa over tha death of Wallace
A. Muir, his paat, present, end future loss of enjoyment of life,
and damages for physical disfigurement end dieability, In en amount
presently not ascertained but which will be proved et trial,
together with prejudgment interest, costs, end attorney's fees, to
the fullest extent allowed by lew.
SECOND CLAIM TOR RELIEF
(Breach of Implied Warranty)
22. Plaintiff repeats end Incorporates by this reference
the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 - 2 1 herein.
23. Burt, Apache, end Does I - X impliedly warranted that
the safety fuse sold by them, end which was ultimately purchaaed
by Bailey from Burt, would be merchantable end fit for the purpoaas
for which it was intended.
24. It waa reasonably foreseeable to Burt, Apache, end
Does I - X, that the eafety fuaa sold by them would be ueed, among
other things, to ignite blasting caps, dynamite, end ANPO.
Further, such e uee for sefety fuse waa one of the purposes for
which eafety fuaa waa end ie Intended.
5

25. Burt, Apache, and Does Z - X breeched their implied
varranties that the safety fuse sold by then and purchased by
bailey from burt vas merchantable and tit for the purposes for
which it vas intended by vailing safety fuse that burned at vidaly
varying rates and vas therefore unfit for the ignition of blasting
caps, dynamite, and AXPO.
26. The breeches of implied warranty by burt, Apache, and
Does X - X, proximately resulted in the explosion vhich injured
bailey and killed Wallace A. Muir.
27.
Plaintiff Baii«y i% entitled to recover from
Defendants all damages sustained by him as a result of the
explosion, including but not limited to, his past, present, and
future medical expenaes, lost earnings, his past, present, and
future physical pain and suffering and mental anguish, hla past,
present, and future emotional distress over the death of Wallace
A. Muir, his past, present, and future loss of enjoyment of life,
and damages for physical disfigurement and disability, in an amount
presently not ascertained but vhich vill be proved at trial,
together with prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees, to
the fullest extent allowed by law.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Negligence)
26. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by this reference
the allegations set forth at Paragrapha 1 - 2 7 herein.
29. As manufacturers and/or sellers of material utilised
in blasting operations, including safety fuse, Burt, Apache, and
Does I - X, owed a duty to the public generally, and to Bailey
specifically, to take reasonable care in the manufacturing,
diatribution, and sale of said materials. Among other things,
6

Burt, Apache, and Doaa X » X, evad Bailay tha duty to provide
sufficient inatructiona and/or warning* concaming tha use of tha
aafaty fuaa in blaating operations, particularly regarding tha
unpredictable and varying Burning rata of tha aafaty fuaa.
Additionally, Apache and/or Doaa X - X, aa tha manufacture™ of tha
safety fuaa, oved Bailay tha duty to take reasonable precautions
and care in tha manufacturing process to insure that tha aafaty
fuaes burned at a constant and safe rate before selling it to
diatributora, wholesalers, or retail outlata.
30. Burt, Apache, and Doaa X - X braached their duties
oved to Bailey, by, among other things, negligently failing to
provide sufficient instructions and/or warnings concerning the uaa
of the aafaty fuse in blesting operations involving blaating eapa,
dynamite, and ANFO.
Additionally, Apache and/or Does X - X
breached their duties owed to Bailey by negligently failing to
Insure that the safety fuae burned at a constant rate before
selling it to distributors, wholesalers, or retail outlets.
31. On information and belief, the rate of burn of the
safety fuse sold by Burt to Bailey and manufactured and distributed
by Apache end Does X - X changes with tine. Defendants owed a duty
of care to the public in general and to Bailey in particular to
control the inventory of white wax aafaty fuae and manage the ahelf
ILife from the time of original manufacture to the time of aale to
the ultimate consumer or user. Defendants breached this duty of
care. Defendants negligently feiled to adequately inquire of and
adequately inform Bailey of the uaes and propensities of the aafaty
fuse that is the subject of this action.
32. The negligence of Burt, Apache, and Does X • X,
proximately resulted in the oxplosion that injured Bailay and
l:llled Wallace A. Muir.
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93.
Plaintiff bailey la entitled to recover from
Defendants all damages sustained by his as a result of the
explosion, including but not limited to, his past, praaant and
future medical expenses, lost aamings, his past, praaant, and
future physical pain and suffering and mantel anguish, bis past,
praaant, and future emotional distress ever the death of Wallace
A. Huir, bla past, praaant, and future loss of enjoyment of U f a ,
and damages for physical disfigurement and disability, in an amount
presently not ascertained but which vill be proved at trial,
together with prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees, to
the fullest extent allowed by lav.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1. For judgment against the Defendants for all damages
sustained by Bailey as a result of the explosion, Including but not
limited to his past, present, and future medical axpenses, lest
earnings, his past, present, and future physical pain and suffering
and mental anguish, his past, present, and future emotional
distress over the death of Wallace A. Muir, his past, present, and
future loss of enjoyment of life, and damages for physical
disfigurement and disability, in an amount presently not
ascertained but which vill be proved at trial.
2. For interest, costs, and attorney'a fees, to the
fullest extent allowed by lav, together with such other and further
relief as the Court deems just or equitable in the premiaes.
DATED this

'"^

day of

Spxv+rymtiT)

AttSrneyTor PiaintifrX

Plaintiff desands trial by jury.
DATED this

Sf~

day of Juna, lt»0.

Plaintiff's Address:
55 6th Avenue
Midvale, Utah S4047

dougapac.com
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H. JAMES CLEGG
[A0681]
SHAWN E. DRANEY
[A4026]
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN fc MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Apache Powder Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS BAILEY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER TRANSFERRING VBNUE TO THE
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT

vs.
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New
Jersey corporation; W. H. BURT
EXPLOSIVES, INC., a New Mexico
corporation, and DOES I-X,

Civil No. 900903526PI
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

This matter came before the court on the defendants' motions
for change of venue.

The court having reviewed the memoranda of

counsel and good cause appearing therefore, this court entered a
minute entry dated October 2, 1990.

Pursuant to this court's*

minute entry dated October 2, 1990, and for the reasons stated
therein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

venue in this matter is hereby transferred to the seventh

Judicial District court for Grand County, state of Utah. As soon
as the plaintiff pays the appropriate transfer and filing fees, the
clerk shall transfer all of the pleadings and other papers filed
in this matter to that court.
ADDENDUM B

2.

Within ten (10) days fron the date of this order,

plaintiff shall submit the appropriate transfer and filing fees to
the appropriate elerX(s).

If plaintiff fails to do so, the case

will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as required by Utah
Code Ann. S 78-13-11 (1953).
DATBD this / -~~ day Of

fl^ftrJb&r
BY THE/COURT:

1990.

H. JAKES CLE6G
[A0681]
SHAWN E. DRANTY
[A4026]
SHOW, CKRISTENSEN & XARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Apache Powder Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS BAILEY,
STIPULATION REGARDING
DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
vs.
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New
Jersey corporation? W. H. BURT
EXPLOSIVES, INC., a New Mexico
corporation, and DOES I-X,

Civil No. 900903526PI
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

Douglas Bailey, Evelyn Muir, Apache Powder Company and W.
H. Burt Explosives, Inc., by and through their attorneys, enter
into this stipulation regarding discovery, as follows:
1.

Douglas Bailey and Evelyn Muir were plaintiffs in

two lawsuits against Apache Powder Company and W. H. Burt
Explosives, Inc., filed in the Seventh District Court, Civil
Number 5719 and Civil Number 5873. These cases have been
dismissed.

Evelyn Muir's claims are now the subject of

ADDENDUM C

Utah supreme court Consolidated Case No. 90100. Douglas Bailey's
claims are now the subject of Third District Court Case No.
900903526PI.
2.

This stipulation is aade for the purpose of promoting

judicial economy; reducing expense, burden, and delay for all
parties; increasing witness convenience; and serving justice.
3.

The undersigned counsel for plaintiffs represents Bvelyn

Muir in Utah supreme Court Consolidated Case No. 90100 and
represents Douglas Bailey in Third District Court Case No.
900903526PI. The undersigned counsel for defendants represent
their respective clients in both cases.
4.

The parties are concerned that discovery conducted in

Civil Number 900903526PI not be repeated in the event the
dismissed claims described above are remanded for trial. The
parties stipulate and agree that if such a remand occurs, the
discovery in civil Number 90090352BPI can be used the same as if
that discovery were conducted in Civil Numbers 5719 and 5873.
Similarly, any discovery conducted in civil numbers 5719 and 5873can be used the same as if that discovery were conducted In Civil
Number 900903526PI. The cases shall be considered consolidated
for purposes of discovery.
5.

Nothing herein or done pursuant hereto shall constitute

a general appearance by any party In any proceeding or a waiver
of any objection to venue or jurisdiction by any party in any
proceeding.
-2-

6.

Zf any change or changes of venue art granttd la any

proceeding described above, or if any consolidation or
consolidations of easts described above are Bade or any
renumbering of the cases occurs, the terms hereof shall be of
full force and effect after such change or changes of venue are
granted or such consolidation or consolidations of eases are Bade
or such renumbering occurs. Nothing herein shall be construed as
a consent to or a waiver of any objection to any change of venue
or consolidation of cases in any proceeding between any of the
parties to this stipulation.
DATED this jT

day of

E. Draney
Attorneys for Defend*
Apache Powder Compj
DATED

this O

day of

fT^f*
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1990.

Copier
Plaintiff
DATED this

day of

, 1990.
CXRISTBNSEN, JENSEN * POWELL
By
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Defendant
w. H. Burt Explosives, Inc.
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PROOF OF SERVICE
This will certify that I caused
four (4) copies of this Brief of Appellee Apache Nitrogen
Products, Appeal No, 900100 to be mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, to each of the following on the 10th day of December,
1990:
Robert H. Copier, Esq.
243 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
and Cross-Appellee
Karra J, Porter, Esq,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 So. West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellee and Cross-Ap
W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc.
DATED this 10th day of December

ShawrrT:. Draney
Attorney for Appellee CrfcssAppellant Apache pjltrocefi Products

-42-

